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SUPREME COURT SELECTION AS WAR 
Michael J. Gerhardt 
I. INTRODUcriON 
The most popular metaphor for describing the process by which Supreme 
Court Justices are selected is war. The voluminous commentary on and records of 
Supreme Court appointments are replete with characterizations of events in different 
phases of the process in militaristic terms. 1 One need look no further for 
confirmation of the continuing pull of the metaphor than to a recent article in the New 
York Times on the likely dynamic in the next Supreme Court confirmation 
proceeding: Neil Lewis' headline reads, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for 
Future Battles and he employs the term "battles" five times, besides the headline, to 
describe what to expect when the next vacancy on the Court arises. 2 
It is tempting to think that, after September 11, the bellicose rhetoric about 
Supreme Court selection as war would dissipate. At the outset of George W. Bush's 
presidency, some prominent Democratic Senators, strategists, and commentators had 
warned that there would effectively be a ''war" if, after the Supreme Court's 
controversial opinion in Bush v. Gore effectively awarding the presidency to him, 
Bush tried to claim a mandate to nominate a conservative ideologue outside of the 
mainstream of constitutional jurisprudence. 3 After September 11, some have 
suggested that the war against terrorism obliges Senators (and others) to give the 
President special deference on his judicial nominations because of their importance 
for maintaining domestic tranquility and ensuring a fully staffed judiciary available to 
properly monitor and process criminal proceedings coming out of the war against 
terrorism. 4 Some explain that the President's judicial nominations generally require 
• Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. This Article is an 
extended version of my talk delivered at Drake Law School as part of its recent Symposium on the 
selection of Supreme Court Justices. I am grateful to Professor Thomas Baker for the opportunity to 
participate in the Symposium and particularly to him and Stephen Carter for helpful comments on an 
earlier draft. This Article is the first of at least two articles on federal judicial selection generally as 
war. 
I. See, e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BA TILE FOR JUSTICE ( 1989). 
2. Neil A. Lewis, From Quiet Nomination to Noisy Test for Next Battles, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 
26, 2002, at Al7. 
3. See, e.g., BUSHY. GORE: THE QuESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman ed., 
forthcoming June 2002). 
4. See, e.g., Editorial, A New Presidency, WAU.ST. J., Sept. 19, 2001, at A20. 
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substantial deference so that he is not forced to squander on them the time and 
political capital he needs to wage the war effort successfully. 
The structure of the Constitution is plainly, however, designed to invite 
conflict. Anyone familiar with the Supreme Court appointments process knows just 
how combative, brutal, nasty, and vitriolic it can be. The structure of the 
Constitution pits Presidents and Senators against each other in the federal 
appointments process, and the framers fully expected (even hoped) conflicts would 
ensue from this design. Their expectation was that the checks and balances of the 
Constitution, including the distribution of authority on judicial appointments, were 
designed, in Madison's famous phrasing, so that "ambition must be made to 
counteract ambition. "5 The framers viewed conflicts over appointments as inevitable 
and even desirable, as the branches each sought to aggrandize their respective powers 
at the expense of the other. The likelihood if not inevitability of friction would 
prevent one branch from becoming tyrannical. 
Yet, the structure of the Constitution invites not only conflict but also 
accommodation. In relatively short order, Presidents and Senators developed 
informal accommodations or informal arrangements to reduce the inevitability of 
conflict and yet preserve some realm of discretion with respect to each Supreme 
Court appointment. These accommodations, expectations, or arrangements are what 
I call norms.6 Following the norms of the Supreme Court appointments process 
promises not sanctions but peaceful coexistence between the branches. 
My thesis is relatively simple: I suggest hostilities break out in the Supreme 
Court selection process when the President, Senators, and/or nominees violate some 
longstanding practices or expectations (some but not all of which constitute 
institutional norms), or the governing norms are in flux. 7 I suggest this is true 
regardless of whether the nation is at war. To be sure, the number of times that 
Presidents in the midst of war have had vacancies on the Court to fill have been 
relatively small, so small in fact that I think one should hesitate to draw any firm 
lessons about such circumstances. History generally suggests, however, that a 
fundamental dynamic in Supreme Court selection is Presidents' and Senators' 
respective efforts to achieve short- and sometimes long-term objectives in the 
particular circumstances in which vacancies on the Court have arisen. How well 
Presidents and Senators achieve their respective objectives and discharge their all-
important duties relating to Supreme Court appointments depends on their 
5. THEFEDERAUSTNo. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1982). 
6. Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments 
Process, 50 DUKEL.J. 1687, 1690-96 (2001) [hereinafter Gerhardt, Norm Theory]. 
7. For some prior discussions of this view, see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL 
APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CoNSTITimONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2000) [hereinafter 
GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS]; Gerhardt, Norm Theory, supra note 6, at 1696-98, 1710-14. 
2002] Supreme Court Selection as War 395 
compliance with and coordination of the governing norms and expectations at the 
times appointments must be made. Presidents and Senators obviously do not perform 
in a vacuum; context is all-important, but context does not guarantee particular 
outcomes. The fact that the nation is at war is of course part of the context of present 
times, but its relevance is not-and will likely not be-understood in precisely the 
same ways or precisely from the same perspectives by Presidents and Senators. A 
vacancy on the Court is surely an opportunity, but it is an opportunity that Presidents 
and Senators are likely to view differently depending on the context. The context 
might well include not just war but also the possibility of influencing or solidifying a 
shift in the Court's direction, a possibility that neither Presidents nor Senators are 
likely to discount for any reason. Indeed, trying both to understand and define the 
social, political, and historical context in which a vacancy has arisen are among the 
basic challenges in the process of Supreme Court selection. How well political 
leaders manage the opportunities they perceive within a given context is a significant 
measure of their performance and success. 
My purpose in this Paper is not to be exhaustive but rather to illustrate some 
significant patterns in Supreme Court selection. In characterizing these patterns, I 
draw on two fields of study that have not yet figured prominently in the study of 
Supreme Court selection: military strategy and institutional norms. Throughout my 
Paper, I hope to demonstrate how synthesizing some of the lessons or insights from 
these two fields helps to illuminate the dynamics of Supreme Court selection, 
particularly how heated conflict is often the consequence of Presidents' attempts to 
change or failures to accommodate the existing norms, longstanding practices, or 
prevailing expectations regarding Supreme Court appointments. 
In the first part of this Article, I will briefly clarify some basic features of my 
framework for analyzing Supreme Court selection. I will clarify some basic 
terminology, discuss the relevance of statistics, and identify some of the basic norms 
in the Supreme Court selection process. These norms possibly include, among 
others, senatorial courtesy (especially robust in the form of a nomination of a Senator 
to the Court), good faith consultation with the Senate, nominees' fitting the basic 
ethical and professional expectations of the times, timing and pace of nominations 
(including avoiding them in election years), and responsible rhetoric in framing the 
terms of initial debate. 
With this general framework in mind, I posit two basic models of conflict in 
Part II. In each, there is an imperial Senate desirous of primary control over Supreme 
Court appointments. The first model is the conflict between an imperial Senate and 
"warrior" Presidents who welcome hostilities as defining moments for themselves, 
the process, and/or their political opposition. Warrior Presidents expect (and even 
invite) war as a consequence of their deliberate attempts to shape or reshape the 
norms or longstanding practices involved in Supreme Court selection. Warrior 
Presidents have had mixed records of success (that is, getting their nominees 
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confirmed under such circumstances), depending on a number of variables. Prime 
examples ofsuccessful"warrior" Presidents are Andrew Jackson, Woodrow Wilson 
with his nomination of Louis Brandeis, and Lyndon Johnson with his nomination of 
Thurgood Marshall President Reagan's nominations ofRehnquist and Scalia, and 
President Bush's nomination of Thomas also fit this pattern. Examples of less 
successful "warrior" Presidents who were bent on changing the norms of Supreme 
Court selection but suffered temporary setbacks are James K. Polk and Grover 
Cleveland. 
The second model is the conflict between an imperial Senate and Presidents 
who have failed to adequately heed or account for a relatively robust institutional 
norm or longstanding practice or expectation regarding Supreme Court selection. In 
my opinion, most failed nominations fit into this category. As one might expect, the 
reasons for these failures are varied, including the basic failures to meet senatorial 
expectations and to learn from history (or predecessors' or even a given President's 
own mistakes), overconfidence, and emotionalism. Examples that fit this pattern 
include Lyndon Johnson's nominations of Fortas and Thornberry, and Richard 
Nixon's nominations ofHaynsworth and Carswell. 
The third Part consists of models in which war over Supreme Court selection 
has largely been avoided. The first is capitulation or presidential abdication of 
authority. The two Presidents who fit this model were Ulysses Grant and Herbert 
Hoover. The second model consists of a spectrum of accommodating Presidents 
and/or Senators who have manipulated or employed institutional norms to their 
advantage or matched their nominations to fit prevailing expectations. Prime 
examples include almost all of President Lincoln's Supreme Court nominees, 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's choice of Hugo Black as his first Supreme Court nominee, 
and both ofPresident Clinton's choices. This Part concludes with a discussion of the 
importance of a President's recognition of the opportunities that chance presents him, 
so that with the right timing, appreciation of the "framing" effect of rhetoric, and 
consolidation or cultivation of political support, a President without a mandate ofhis 
own can nevertheless peacefully work to shift or reshape either norms or 
expectations, as occurred with Chester Arthur's nominations of Horace Gray and 
Samuel Blatchford, and Theodore Roosevelt's nomination of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes. 
In the final part, I briefly discuss two patterns that can be inferred from a 
survey of these four models in operation. The first involves the rhetoric employed in 
Supreme Court confirmation contests, which tends to track the rhetoric of war. The 
second involves the nominations made in times of war or those that might be 
considered most closely analogous. Under such circumstances, Presidents have been 
able to achieve relatively conflict-free confirmation proceedings for their Supreme 
Court nominees when they rather than the Senate have been willing to bend or 
compromise in either defining or trying to fill their criteria for selection. 
2002] Supreme Court Selection as War 397 
II. THE TERMS OF ENGAGEMENT 
A few introductory clarifications are in order. The first is about the relevance 
or significance of statistics. To date, roughly one in five Supreme Court nominations 
has failed. 8 In his excellent study of the Supreme Court selection process, David 
Yaloff notes that in the twentieth century eighty-nine percent of Supreme Court 
nominees have been confirmed, and "twelve of fourteen nominees between 1970 and 
1994 have garnered Senate approval.''9 For Yalof, these statistics underscore the 
huge importance of the nomination phase of the Supreme Court appointment 
process. 10 
There are, however, two caveats I would add to Yalotrs analysis. First, one 
would be wrong to infer that success can be so narrowly defined as confirmation of a 
nominee. Sometimes, getting a nominee confirmed can be a Pyrric victory. For 
instance, the Senate confirmed Clarence Thomas in the narrowest vote yet for a 
successful Supreme Court nominee, but the fight was so bruising as to cost President 
Bush more political support than he had hoped to gain. Even though the Senate 
overwhelmingly confirmed President Clinton's two Supreme Court nominees, it is 
hard to say Clinton came out of the process cost-free, for he had acted so indecisively 
in choosing nominees that his political foes learned that he could be easily rolled into 
avoiding troublesome nominations and pushed toward making ones more agreeable 
to them. 
Secondly, my models reflect an important dynamic in the selection process. 
They are premised on the unusual power and opportunity that Presidents have to set 
the terms of debate in a confirmation proceeding. Senators simply have more limited 
power to set or influence the agenda in a confirmation proceeding because they are 
largely confined in the process to a defensive posture. In structural terms, this means 
that Senators face the structural disadvantage of being in a defensive posture 
throughout almost the entirety of the appointments process. 11 
Third, the basic terms of war and norms need to be defined. With neither do I 
mean to rely on strict terms of art. I sometimes loosely use battle and war, though I 
recognize the importance differences between them. Indeed, it is useful to keep in 
mind that a Supreme Court contest is more like a battle than a war, for it generally 
reflects or is waged against a backdrop of a larger contest among national political 
leaders. One important mechanism in these battles consists of institutional norms, by 
which I mean the informal understandings or arrangements among the leadership of 
8. GERHARDT, APPOINlMENTS, supra note 7, at 354 n.45. 
9. DAVID A. Y ALOF, PURSUIT OF JUSTICES viii (1999). 
10. /d. 
11. John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation 
Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEx. L. REv. 633,652-59 (1993). 
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national institutions developed over time and deviations from which often trigger 
sanctions or disapproval. 12 
Fourth, it is helpful to recognize the likely nonns applicable in the Supreme 
Court appointments process. The most robust of these is senatorial courtesy, which 
manifests itself in at least two ways.13 The first is the deference usually (but 
admittedly not always) given by Senators to the nomination of a colleague to the 
Supreme Court. The Senate confirmed all six Senators nominated to the Court in the 
twentieth century-Edward Douglass White as Chief Justice, and as Associate 
Justices George Sutherland, Hugo Black, Jimmy Byrnes, Harold Burton, and 
Sherman Minton.14 The other robust norms, in my judgment, include good faith 
consultation with the Senate, matching nominees to prevailing ethical and 
professional expectations of the times, responsible or credible rhetoric in 
characterizing nominees' credentials, and timing. These nonns are evident from the 
conflicts surveyed or reviewed in the next Part. 
ill. MODELS OF WAR 
This Part surveys the two basic models of conflict in the Supreme Court 
appointments process. In tum, I consider warrior Presidents who have invited 
conflict and other Presidents who have ignored or discounted appointments nonns at 
their or their nominees' peril. 
A. The Warrior Presidents 
In the classic The Art of War, Sun Tzu makes two trenchant observations that 
one might imagine would resonate with most Presidents in making Supreme Court 
nominations. The first is, "To win without fighting is best."15 The other is that the 
side that knows when to fight and when not will take the victory. "There are routes 
not to be followed, armies not to be attacked, citadels not to be besieged. "16 One has 
to wonder why any President would disregard either of these, but many seem to have 
done so. So, one obvious question with which to begin an analysis of the models of 
conflicts within the Supreme Court appointments is why some Presidents seem to 
welcome a fight? For it is clear that some Presidents-! call them the warrior 
12. See id. at 652·59. 
13. For a general discussion, see GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS, supra note 7. 
14. Even people who have served in the House seem to have bad their nominations receive 
substantial deference from the Senate. In the twentieth century, the former House members 
successfully nominated to the Court include William Moody as Associate Justice and Fred Vinson as 
Chief Justice. 
15. SUN Tzu, THE ART OF WAR vii (Thomas Cleary trans., 1988). 
c 16. Jd. at 125. 
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Presidents-make certain nominations with the expectations of heated opposition, 
but do so because they conceive such contests as opportunities to defme themselves 
or their political opposition or to consolidate political support. So much the better if 
the Presidents can also prevail in the end. In other words, sometimes Presidents are 
eager to do battle. 
The warrior Presidents in American history tend to have one important thing in 
common-they deliberately enter into or invite heated conflicts over nominees for the 
sake of shaping or reshaping the basic norms or expectations in the process. Some 
successful Presidents who have done just that are Andrew Jackson, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Lyndon Johnson. Jackson purposefully set out to secure more 
presidential discretion or control over Supreme Court nominationsP Like every 
other nineteenth century President, Jackson confronted an imperial Senate bent on 
maintaining its dominance or primacy in the appointments of Supreme Court 
Justices, 18 but, unlike most other nineteenth century Presidents, Jackson sought to 
reshape this basic balance of power. Consequently, he consulted little with Senate 
leaders (including several who wanted to embarrass him) and made nominations that 
he knew would trigger dramatic-and, he thought, sharply defining-conflicts. The 
best known of these nominations was Roger Taney as an Associate Justice (following 
his rejection as Treasury Secretary) and later as Chief Justice. President Jackson used 
the rejections ofhis nominees to tarnish his opposition on the campaign trail, and by 
the time he nominated Taney as Chief Justice he had managed to help a slim majority 
of his party to take control of the Senate. Thus, it was with great delight he could 
watch, on his last morning as President, his Vice President Martin Van Buren-who 
only a few years before had his nomination as Ambassador to Great Britain rejected 
by the Senate-succeed him as President and be sworn into the presidency by none 
other than Taney. 
The next two examples are President Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Louis 
Brandeis and Lyndon Johnson's nomination of Thurgood Marshall. Separated by 
almost five decades, the two nominations were alike in that in each the President 
sought to break a glass ceiling in making the appointment. In other words, both 
nominations were made for the sake of a larger principle for which the President 
signaled unambiguously his willingness to fight. Wilson sought to nominate the first 
Jew to serve on the Court,19 while Johnson's objective was to nominate the first 
17. GERHARDT, APPOINTMENTS, supra note 7, at 52. 
18. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS: Cl..EANING UP THE 
FEDERAL APPOINTMENT PROCESS (1994). 
19. I hasten to add that Judah Benjamin was the first Jew considered seriously for 
appointment to the Court. After failing to get other nominees confirmed to the Court, President 
Millard Fillmore made known his interest in nominating Benjamin to the Court. Senate leaders made 
known their willingness to confirm Benjamin who had recently been elected to the Senate. Benjamin 
asked Fillmore not to nominate him to the Court because he preferred at the time to serve in the Senate. 
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African-American to the Court. As Johnson famously put it upon making the 
nomination, "I believe it is the right thing to do, the right time to do it, the right man 
and the right place."20 It was the right time in part because the President's party 
controlled the Senate, and so the challenge for Johnson, as it was for Wilson, was to 
keep his party firmly in line behind the nomination. Northern Democrats, liberals, 
and moderates rallied in defense of the nomination, so, in spite of the nastiness and 
bigotry of some Southern Democrats the Senate conftrmed his nomination, 69-11. 
The fmal example of a warrior President is Ronald Reagan in 1986. Near the 
height of his popularity, Reagan was willing, as Roosevelt and Wilson before him, to 
expend his popularity for the sake of marking a shift in the Court's direction. His 
dual nomination ofRehnquist and Scalia was a bold move-indeed, it constitutes the 
first and only time in history that a President has successfully nominated at the same 
time someone as Chief Justice and another as an Associate Justice. It was 
particularly bold, because the last time it had been tried it had failed miserably when 
the Senate forced Lyndon Johnson's friend, Abe Fortas, to withdraw his nomination 
as Chief Justice in 1968.21 Nevertheless, Reagan and his staff calculated correctly 
that the Rehnquist nomination would not only get through the Senate but run 
interference for the Scalia nomination. They figured that Democratic Senators who 
were likely to be disposed against both of the nominees would not have the political 
capital to oppose both, so they would have to choose one to contest. They chose 
Rehnquist, who received the most negative votes ever cast against a nominee for the 
chief justiceship; but, having failed to defeat his nomination, Democratic Senators 
had nothing left to contest the nomination of the ftrst Italian-American ever to the 
Court.22 
There have been, however, examples of warrior Presidents who have fared not 
so well. Any great military strategist will tell you, war is risky, and thus an assault on 
an institutional norm carries no guarantees of success. For example, two other 
Presidents-James K. Polk and Grover Cleveland-deliberately invited hostilities in 
the hopes of diminishing or thwarting the norm of Senatorial courtesy in the 
nineteenth century. The practice in place at the time was that Senators expected 
Presidents to consult with them before nominating people from their states to the 
Court. Polk, perhaps emboldened by the example of his mentor Jackson a few years 
before, deliberately challenged the norm. In 1846, he nominated George Woodward 
to a vacancy on the Court that the Senate had blocked his predecessor John Tyler 
EuN. EVANS, JUDAH P. BENJAMIN: THE JEWISH CONFEDERATE 83-84 (1988). It is of course telling 
that Fillmore would have been able to overcome the political opposition to his making a Supreme 
Court appointment as well as any of the prejudice of the times against Jews through senatorial courtesy. 
20. Y ALOF, supra note 9, at 90. 
21. See id. at 94. 
22. !d. at 155. 
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from filling in 1844. Though Woodward was from Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania 
Senator Simon Cameron was decidedly against the nomination not only because Polk 
had refused to get his consent to the nomination before making it but also because 
Polk had not consulted James Buchanan, another powerful Pennsylvanian who was 
serving as Polk's Secretary of State, to sign off on it beforehand. With Buchanan and 
Cameron incensed about being cut out of the nomination process, the nomination 
lacked critical support in the Senate. Cameron took the lead in opposing it in the 
Senate, and he prevailed in part because other Senators figured their defense of the 
prerogative would work to their institutional advantage.23 
Almost five decades later, Grover Cleveland in 1893 found himself fighting a 
similar battle. In his second term, Cleveland got his third chance to make a Supreme 
Court appointment. Because the retiring Justice was from New York, the expectation 
was that President Cleveland would fill a seat with a New Yorker agreeable to the 
senior Senator from his party. Cleveland turned twice to New Yorkers, each of 
whom were widely considered to be eminently qualified but each had not been 
cleared with New York's senior Senator David Hill who, like Cameron before, 
gathered his colleagues to defend the prerogative of senatorial courtesy. Cleveland 
had been willing to cater to the prevailing practice of filling a vacancy with someone 
from the retiring Justice's state, but he was not disposed to cater to Hill, who led an 
anti-Cleveland faction of New York Democrats. Rather than nominate yet another 
New Yorker after the Senate had rejected two of his nominees at Hill's bidding, 
President Cleveland turned to a different norm to defeat Hill's claim; he nominated 
Louisiana Senator Edward Douglass White, whom the Senate quickly unanimously 
confirmed. 
Interestingly, when Justice Howell Jackson, a Southerner, died unexpectedly in 
1895, President Cleveland did not tum to a Southerner. Instead, he turned to a New 
Yorker. This time, he asked for Senator Hill's approval, which Hill gave.24 In so 
doing, Cleveland was able to diminish the strength of the longstanding expectations 
that a President would replace a retiring Justice with a nominee from the same state. 
In other words, Cleveland had found a way to employ existing norms to divide and 
conquer expected opposition. 
B. Mistakes in War 
Much more often than not, the Presidents who have failed have done so 
because they have failed to follow or heed institutional norms or longstanding 
23. . HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS AND SENATORS: A HisTORY OF THE U.S. 
SUPREME CoURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CUNTON 109 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 
1992). 
24. /d. at 146. 
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expectations or practices. I mention only two of the more dramatic such failures. 
The first is the dual nominations to which I just referred-Johnson's nominations of 
Fortas as Chief Justice and Homer Thornberry to replace Fortas.25 There was a lot 
that went wrong with these nominations. The most serious problems were Johnson's 
failures to adhere to basic norms. The first was that he had failed to consult with 
Senate leaders over his rather unorthodox nominations. Indeed, Johnson's dual 
nominations constituted the first time that a President was nominating a Chief Justice 
along with another nominee to the Court. Many Senators were not amused that 
Johnson was being so brash. 
The second norm Johnson breached sealed his undoing because he made the 
nominations in an election year in which he was a lame duck. Had Johnson 
consulted history, he would have discovered that this was a period at which 
Presidents have tended to wield their lowest influence whatsoever in nominating 
Justices. 26 
Surprisingly, Richard Nixon did not learn from Johnson's mistakes or history 
as Clausewitz suggests a good general should do. 27 Indeed, President Nixon failed to 
heed the warning of the events that brought about the vacancy he was trying to fill 
with the nomination of Clement Haynsworth. Fortas' nomination as Chief Justice 
failed in part because of his poor ethical judgment, and he left the Court under a 
cloud because of other ethical breaches brought to light after his failed nomination as 
Chief Justice. Nixon failed to foresee that Democratic Senators might have learned 
from Fortas' failure. In particular, Democratic Senators might have learned that a 
nominee's ethical breaches can torpedo his nomination-this was not a new lesson in 
the appointments process, but it had not been the focus of Supreme Court selection. 
PresidentNixon was perhaps led into a false sense of security by the fact that the 
Judicial Conference had not found Haynsworth had sat on some cases in spite of 
possible conflicts of interest; he could not have expected Democrats, on the heels of 
Fortas' debacle, to have been so generous. Bent on payback for the failure of the 
Fortas nomination, Democratic Senators regarded Haynsworth 's ethical problems as 
bad as Fortas' and, at the same time, wanted to signal a new era in Supreme Court 
selection in which nominees could generally be expected to meet a higher ethical 
standard. 
Interestingly, Presidents Johnson and Nixon both committed another 
fundamental mistake in nominating Justices. Clausewitz warns that commanders 
25. For an excellent, recent analysis of the fates of these nominations, see Y ALOFF, supra 
note 9, at 91-94. 
26. GERHARDT, APPoiNfMENTS, supra note 7, at 123. 
27. CARL VoN CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 170-74 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds., 
Princeton Univ. Press 1984) (1832). 
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should refrain from making decisions based on emotions or the heat of the moment, 28 
but Johnson and Nixon each allowed their emotions to get the better of them in 
making certain nominations. This was the case, of course, with the dual nominations 
of Fortas as Chief Justice and Thornberry to replace Fortas. The nominations not 
only signaled a degree of overconfidence on the part of Johnson that turned off some 
Senators, but Johnson did not bother to consult with Senators about his prospective 
choices. His loyalty to his friends got the better of him. 
It was anger, not loyalty, that undid President Nixon's nomination of Harold 
Carswell. Angered by the Senate's rejection of Haynsworth, Nixon responded 
quickly with the nomination of Carswell in the hopes of catching some Senators off 
balance and in effect daring the Senate to alienate an important constituency. 29 
Interestingly, President Reagan reacted to some extent in the same way in the 
immediate aftermath of Bork's rejection by waiting only a few days indicate his 
intention to nominate Douglas Ginsburg.30 PresidentReagan hoped no doubt to 
secure a similar nominee ideologically but no more attractive (and in some ways 
more problematic) than the nominee just rejected. In the cases of Carswell and 
Ginsburg, the Senate moved relatively quickly against the nominees in part because 
of the offense felt by the majority at being dissed by the President. 
It is even possible that a President fails to learn from history (or the past 
patterns of success) in the process he employs for choosing a nominee. Indeed, 
Clausewitz also suggests a general in times of war needs to make his chain of 
command as short as possible. In any event, in both times that Bill Clinton had to 
choose a Supreme Court nominee he failed both to learn from the prior practices of 
administrations in consolidating authority over nominations as well as the basic tactic 
of keeping his chain as short as possible. Instead, in choosing his nominee he shifted 
his criteria more than once and shifted authority and sought advice from different 
quarters when he was frustrated with the advice he was getting.31 The end results 
were painfully protracted processes for picking nominees coupled with the further 
painful practice of sometimes floating names publicly to get reactions and then 
dropping the names when public opposition began to coalesce. The lack of a clear 
hierarchy for making the decision invited turf wars over the people who would be 
responsible for advising the President. 
One cannot conclude with a commentary on war over Supreme Court nominees 
without recognizing the special problems faced by an unelected President. With a 
few notable exceptions discussed in the next Part, vice presidents who have ascended 
to the presidency because of a President's death have encountered serious hostilities 
28. /d. at 106-07. 
29. See YALOFF, supra note 9, at 108-12. 
30. SHELDON GoLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 317 (1997). 
31. See Y ALOFF, supra note 9, at 196-205. 
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when they have tried to assert a mandate different from the ones advanced by their 
predecessors. Without a mandate of their own, these unelected Presidents have run 
the risk ofhaving no political base of support for their actions as President, including 
but not limited to nominating Justices. This was surely the case with both Tyler32 and 
Fillmore,33 each of whom had not shared his President's political outlook and each of 
whom was viewed as a pariah by some important constituencies within the 
President's party. These circumstances would have perhaps counseled the Presidents 
to use nominations as an olive branch to their potential political foes, but neither did 
so; both made nominations for which they simply had no mandates. Moreover, 
without political futures in their futures, Senate leaders saw little downside to 
scuttling their nominees until a more agreeable President came along, with the 
Senate's rejecting five of Tyler's six nominations34 and three of Fillmore's four 
nominations to fill vacancies arising during their respective presidencies.35 
IV. ACHIEVING PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE 
In this Part, I consider two models in which serious combat over a Supreme 
Court nominee was averted. The first is presidential abdication of authority or simply 
giving the Senate carte blanche. The second is Presidents' deft manipulation of 
institutional norms to achieve both their short- and long-term objectives. After 
surveying both models, I suggest some lessons and implications to derive from a 
survey of both of them in operation. 
A. Presidential Abdication of Authority 
In American history, only two Presidents effectively allowed Senate leaders to 
choose Supreme Court nominees. In each case, the President lacked the political 
clout or support at the time a vacancy arose to assert his will over the process. The 
choice to fight or lay down, when it came, was easily made, because the President 
simply foresaw nothing but disaster if he did not abdicate his authority in filling the 
vacancy. 
The first instance of abdication involved Ulysses Grant. Vacancies arose on 
the Court in both 1869 and 1870 for President Grant to fill. In 1869, he nominated 
his very able Attorney General Ebenezer Hoar to one. Hoar faced considerable and 
ultimately fatal opposition in the Senate, because he had relentlessly alienated Senate 
32. For a discussion ofTyler's difficulties in the appointments process. see JosEPH HARRis, 
THE ADVICE AND CoNSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF THE CoNFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE 
UNITED STATES SENATE (1953). 
33. For a discussion of Fillmore's difficulties in the appointments process, see id. 
34. ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 40. 
3S. Jd. at 110-12. 
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leaders by urging lower court appointments based on merit rather than patronage. 
Grant's eagerness to appoint Hoar, coupled with his deteriorating political strength, 
gave him virtually no leverage in making the nomination. 36 In the aftermath of the 
Senate's rejection of Hoar and Grant's request that the Senate reconsider Hoar's 
nomination, the President acceded to a petition signed by a large majority of the 
House and Senate urging him to nominate Lincoln's War Secretary Edwin Stanton 
for a second vacancy that had arisen in the meantime. Grant figured ifhe nominated 
Stanton, more a political foe than friend, to the one vacancy the Senate might agree to 
his preferred nominee Hoar for the other. He was wrong. The Senate quickly 
confirmed Stanton, but before it took any action to reconsider Hoar's nomination 
(which it had already rejected once earlier in the year) Stanton died of a heart attack. 
With Stanton dead, the deal, if it ever was on, was also dead, and the Senate refused 
to re-consider Hoar.37 
The second instance of abdication occurred in 1932.38 By the time the vacancy 
arose, Hoover had largely squandered the support of the leadership of his own party, 
in part because he had sought to refuse to give them their customary control over 
lower court appointments. When Holmes announced his impending retirement from 
the Court, Hoover came up with a list of ten candidates, but the list proved futile. 
When Senate leaders learned of the list, they indicated that the only name they would 
consider was that of Benjamin Cardozo. With so many other domestic and 
international crises to handle, Hoover did not dally; he cut the deal, made the 
nomination, and moved on. 
B. The Pacifzst or Noncombatant Presidents 
In contrast to the so-called warrior Presidents, the pacifist Presidents have 
employed institutional norms or longstanding expectations or practices to secure their 
desired objectives in the Supreme Court selection process. The first example is none 
other than Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln understood that on domestic matters the 
Congress generally considered itself supreme. In his early days in politics Lincoln 
was a Whig, a party dedicated to congressional supremacy on legislative policy. 
Lincoln was, in other words, no Jacksonian when it came to the domestic powers of 
the presidency. So, Lincoln commonly deferred to the Congress on domestic matters, 
including patronage appointments to all kinds of office. His deference was not, 
however, automatic or extreme; it was usually based on each side getting something 
36. See generally HARRIS, supra note 32. 
3 7. See ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 127-28. Grant eventually found two other acceptable 
nominees, William Strong from Pennsylvania (who was enthusiastically supported by party leaders 
there) and Joseph Bradley, a Republican with good business connections and thus agreeable to 
Republican leaders for the new seat to which he had been nominated. /d. 
38. See generally HARRIS, supra note 32. 
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out of the appointment. Lincoln's Supreme Court appointments would prove to be 
different only in degree not in kind from the other appointments he made as 
President. Consequently, he generally deferred to congressional leaders on the 
candidates for filling vacancies with the primary condition ihat they met criteria set 
forth for their selection by the President. In all six appointments he made to the 
Court, Lincoln faced no serious conflict with Senators but instead was able to fmd 
nominees agreeable to Republican leaders each time. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt is a second example of a President adept at employing 
institutional norms to get his way. When he fmally got an opportunity to fill a 
vacancy on the Court, it did not happen until the beginning of his second term. 
When the vacancy fmally arose in 193 7, it proved to be a pivotal one, for the retiring 
Justice was one of the most ardent opponents to constitutional foundations of the 
New Deal-Willis Van DeVanter. There was no question there would be a fight, 
because the appointment, if confirmed, would produce for the first time in the 
Court's history a critical mass of Justices who opposed economic due process and 
supported greater judicial deference to congressional exercises of its Commerce 
Clause power. Roosevelt was not interested in a compromise. His nomination 
proved to be surprising not because he turned to a Senator or an ardent supporter of 
the New Deal, but rather he turned to someone who, as a Senator, had not been 
known as a great constitutional thinker (like Sutherland) but as an ardent partisan. 
The views of his nominee, Hugo Black, were well known to his colleagues in the 
Senate, but the powerful norm of Senatorial deference to the nomination of a 
colleague to the Court worked in Black's favor and led many Senators who might 
have opposed him otherwise to accept his nomination begrudgingly. 
Though Bill Clinton's search for a Supreme Court nominee hardly followed 
the paths set by Lincoln and Roosevelt, he was able in the end to find nominees 
whom the Senate quickly and congenially accepted. He achieved these outcomes in 
part because he both consulted seriously with Senate leaders from both parties in the 
hopes of reaching accommodations with them and accepted the developing norm in 
the Senate to fill vacancies on the Court with sitting judges. 39 In making these 
accommodations, President Clinton did not, however, abdicate presidential authority. 
Throughout his process he had sufficiently open, pliable criteria that could be met by 
any number of able people. By having a relatively open vetting process in choosing 
nominees, he made it possible for Senate leaders and others to shoot down 
problematic nominations before they could be made. In the end, President Clinton 
claimed victory in part by accepting the terms on which the Senate (and others) were 
laying down as indispensable to the nominations being made. He could claim the 
victory because the terms were consistent with the basic criteria he had set forth at 
the outset of his search. 
39. See generally GERHARDT, APPoiNTMENTS, supra note 7, at 301-14. 
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Even Presidents who have lacked the electoral successes ofLincoln, Roosevelt, 
and Lincoln have succeeded in maneuvering the Supreme Court selection process 
with little or no warfare. Two interesting examples are Chester Arthur's two 
Supreme Court appointments and Theodore Roosevelt before he was elected to the 
presidency in his own right. 
Few if any Presidents have entered office with lower expectations than Chester 
Arthur, though few have wielded or maneuvered around the norms of Supreme Court 
appointments more ably than he did.40 Several factors help to explain Arthur's 
success. First, he benefited enormously from lowered expectations. The only office 
of note held by Arthur prior to being selected as Garfield's running mate was the 
Collector of the Port Authority of New York. Both this position and his selection as 
Garfield's running mate were arranged by his mentor Senator Roscoe Conkling. So, 
when Arthur ascended to the presidency, most feared he would simply do Conkling's 
bidding. To the extent he made nominations that exceeded people's expectations, it 
was a pleasant and welcome surprise. Second, Arthur's attempt to fill one of the 
vacancies in 1882 with his old boss Conkling tracked rather than breached the norms 
of Supreme Court appointments, for, as a powerful Senator, Conkling was the 
beneficiary of the robust norm of senatorial courtesy. Though not widely elated, 
Senators overwhelmingly confirmed Conkling to the vacancy. When Conkling 
decided immediately after his confirmation not to serve on the Court, the vacancy 
passed again to Arthur, but this time Senators could heave another collective sigh of 
relief because they knew Conkling would no longer be a candidate. Third, Arthur 
appreciated and took advantage of the timing. Garfield's assassination by a frustrated 
office-seeker dramatized the need, long discounted by both parties, for a professional 
civil service. Arthur recognized that the time had come for such legislation, and 
became the first President to sign the Civil Service Act into law. Arthur took the 
additional step of raising the standards for appointments all around, including the 
Supreme Court.41 His two nominations, besides Conkling, were of first-rate, widely 
respected state court jurists. These appointments helped the Republican Party claim 
the political advantage in taking the lead on merit-based appointments, whose time 
had then come. Last but not least, Arthur's two Supreme Court appointees were 
ideologically and regionally agreeable to Senate leaders. This acceptability, coupled 
with the outstanding records of the nominees, ensured their smooth confirmation. 
40. ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 137-39. One reason Arthur might have acted contrary to 
expectations is the desire to deflect or combat rumors that he was somehow involved in Garfield's 
assassination. Even if this were a factor, it is an additional indication of Arthur's sensitivity to external 
pressure in making his Supreme Court nominations. 
41. GERHARDT, APPO.!JIITMENTS, supra note 7, at 277, 379 n.40. 
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The next vice president to ascend to the presidency as a result of a presidential 
assassination was Teddy Roosevelt in 1901.42 Like Arthur, he would have the 
opportunity to fill a vacancy on the Court shortly after taking office. At that time, 
Roosevelt was distrusted by many of the leaders of his own party, some of whom 
thought he was crazy, while many Democrats had little or no idea what to expect 
from him. Many Senators feared Roosevelt not just because of his brazenness but 
also his obsession with reform; they worried about the extent to which he would 
challenge prevailing norms, including those applying to appointments. 
Though unelected and without a mandate of his own, Theodore Roosevelt 
succeeded masterly in making his first Supreme Court appointment his own. There 
are several reasons for this success. First, he set his model for a Supreme Court 
appointment extraordinarily high. As he pondered his choice, he explained to his 
patron Senator Henry Cabot Lodge that he wanted to appoint someone on the order 
of John Marshall.43 President Roosevelt considered Marshall's greatness to have 
been his steadfast commitment to the broad constitutional principles of his political 
party, which Roosevelt thought history had proven as correct. Convinced that history 
would prove his own party's principles as the right ones for the country, Roosevelt 
wanted someone who both shared his party's principles and could stick to them as 
fiercely as Marshall did. As a practical matter, this meant he would look for someone 
who shared similar views as the retiring Justice, none other than Horace Gray of 
Massachusetts. In looking for such a nominee, Roosevelt could be certain to fmd a 
person agreeable to Republican leaders as well as someone from the state of the 
retiring Justice. Thus, the nominee enjoyed the support of Roosevelt's mentor 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. Second, President Roosevelt's choice was one of the 
leading jurists in the country, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The choice was astute in 
part because it could be guaranteed not only to appeal to those who would have 
wanted to see another person from Massachusetts appointed, but also to those who 
were interested in finding a like-minded jurist to replace Gray. Moreover, Holmes' 
stature guaranteed he would be a difficult (but admittedly not impossible) target. The 
question was whether the likely opposition to the appointment, even from within 
Roosevelt's party, was prepared to take on an icon. Third, in making the nomination, 
President Roosevelt signaled his willingness to fight. In some cases, as we have seen 
with President Clinton, signaling indecisiveness or ambivalence can invite attack, but 
Roosevelt wanted to squelch any attack by making clear his willingness not just to go 
to war with any opposition but to take his case to the American people. His models 
of the presidency were Lincoln and Jackson and so he was fully prepared to do battle 
if necessary. The opposition blinked, and Holmes was easily confirmed. 
42. ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 156. 
43. /d. at 158. 
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V. LIKELY FUTURE PA TIERNS OF CONFLICTS 
My sketch of some of the models of Supreme Court appointments helps to 
focus attention on two other significant patterns in the process. The first involves the 
rhetoric employed in confirmation contests. At least two different rhetorical patterns 
are noteworthy in the process. On the one hand, presidential rhetoric literally can set 
the terms of debate. Their rhetoric thus can both help and hurt their nominees, 
because the process allows Presidents (and their nominees) to be held accountable for 
the expectations they raise through their comments about their nominees' 
qualifications. Thurgood Marshall and Ruth Bader Ginsburg both became rather 
formidable nominees in part because they were as good as the Presidents who 
nominated them claimed them to be, 44 but President George H. W. Bush's 
characterization of Clarence Thomas as ''the most qualified person in the country'' to 
replace Thurgood Marshall created problems for the nominee because Thomas was 
not yet up to matching that demanding description. 45 
The second pattern involves the efforts of the contending sides to demonize 
each other in contests over Supreme Court appointments. The objective of the 
supporters of a nomination has been to demonize people who oppose the nomination, 
while the opponents of a nomination have tended to demonize the nominee. 
Interestingly, the efforts to demonize opposition tracks the rhetoric employed in times 
of war. A recent headline in the New York Times suggestively reads, A Nation 
Defines Itself by Its Evil Enemies.46 The article suggests that in a war national leaders 
tend to rally support by demonizing the enemy. The same holds true in judicial 
confirmation proceedings in which the contending sides follow a similar strategy. 
Bork was famously characterized as well outside the mainstream, 47 while a series of 
successful nominees have been defended as moderate or principled conservatives in 
the great tradition of justices whom most Senators are thought to admire and want 
nominees to resemble.4s 
The second pattern of note is the one with which I began involving the likely 
relevance of war to the selection of a Justice. As one might expect, a great deal 
depends on the popularity of the war during which a President has nominated a 
justice. Only a few Presidents have made Supreme Court nominations in times of 
war, only two of which were fighting for a cause popular with most Senators. The 
two were Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The point at which President 
Roosevelt's approach to Supreme Court selection most closely resembled President 
44. See Y ALOF, supra note 9, at 89. 
45. See CARTER, supra note 18, at 134-37. 
46. Robert F. Worth, A Nation Defines Itself by Its Evil Enemies, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 
2002, § 4, at 1. 
47. See CARTER, supra note 18, at 120-21. 
48. See id. at 128-33. 
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Lincoln's was the 1940s, the period in which of course the nation formally entered 
the Second World War. In these years, Roosevelt's nominees were Jimmy Byrnes in 
June 1941, Stone as Chief Justice also in June 1941 (the day on which the Senate 
confirmed Byrnes), and Wiley Rutledge in February 1943.49 Byrnes was a former 
Senator and thus able to take advantage of Senatorial courtesy. Stone was a 
Republican whose nomination bespoke of bipartisanship and a desire on the part of 
the President to put aside party differences as best he could under the circumstances. 
Rutledge was a relatively inoffensive nominee whom most Senators did not know or 
take the time to know. In contrast to either Lincoln or Roosevelt, Richard Nixon 
never received any deference from the Senate because his nominations coincided 
with the ongoing Vietnam War. Nixon's refusal to consult with Senate leaders, 
combined with the increasing unpopularity of the war, ensured that his nominees 
received no special consideration once they reached the floor of the Senate. 5° 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have tried to suggest war is not inevitable in the Supreme Court appointments 
process. It can be avoided if political leaders choose to follow the nonns they have 
developed over the years for guiding the process. War breaks out when Presidents 
breach these nonns. 
Since war is, in Clausewitz' famous judgment, an extension of politics, one is 
left to wonder about the politics or motives driving combat over Supreme Court 
appointments. In considering the reasons for combat, I cannot help but recall a 
question raised by Winston Churchill in the midst of World War II. When asked 
whether the East End of London should be shut down and theater productions 
stopped because of the bombing of the city, Churchill responded, ''No. What the hell 
do you think we are fighting for?" As combats erupt over Supreme Court 
appointments, it is useful to ask, in a similar vein, "What are each of the sides 
fighting for, and what do these contests tell us about them and, more importantly, 
us?" 
49. See generally ABRAHAM, supra note 23, at 54-SS. 
SO. See id. at 9-16. 
